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Case No. 20060954-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Andrew Brink,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court act within its discretion in excluding expert testimony on
the deficiencies of eyewitness identification, where the court invited counsel to
submit jury instructions tailored to the proposed expert testimony?
Standard of Review. "Whether expert testimony on the inherent deficiencies of
eyewitness identification should be allowed is within the sound discretion of the
trial court." State v. Butterfield, 2001UT 59, 1 43,27 P.3d 1133; accord State v. Hollen,

2002 UT 35, J 66,44 P.3d 794 (holding that '"[t]he trial court has wide discretion in
determining the admissibility of expert testimony 7 " on eyewitness identification)
(quoting State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 1993)). Under this standard, the
appellate court will not reverse a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert
testimony absent an abuse of discretion, that is, "'unless the decision exceeds the
limits of reasonability.'" Hollen, 2002 UT 35, \ 66 (quoting Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, with a
sentencing enhancement for using a dangerous weapon. R. 1-3. After being bound
over for trial following a preliminary hearing, defendant filed a notice that he would
call as an expert witness Dr. David Dodd, Associate Professor of Psychology at the
University of Utah. R. 30-31,42. The State filed a motion in limine to exclude Dr.
Dodd's proposed testimony on eyewitness identification. R. 73-84. After holding an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion and excluded the
testimony, but invited counsel to submit modified Long instructions "in light of the
evidence presented regarding eyewitness identification." R. 289-90. Following a
two-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 324-25. Defendant moved
to arrest judgment, but that motion was denied. R. 366-67; see R. 377-78. Defendant
was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six years to life. R. 377-78. He
timely appealed, and the Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court
pursuant to rule 42(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. R. 379-80, 388-89.
B. Statement of Facts
The Robbery
On the evening of October 5,2005, Alicia Warnock went to the Breathe Day
Spa for her once-a-month "facial." R. 395:13-14. Therapist Amber Devoge finished
3

Warnock's facial at approximately 8:00 p.m. and the two women walked to the front
of the spa to look at some facial products. R. 395: 16, 66; R. 396: 121-22. While
discussing some of the products, Warnock's attention was drawn to two men
standing just outside the glass double doors to the spa. R. 395:17. The men, who
were "at most" four or five feet away from Warnock, "caught [her] eye" because
they did not appear to be "your typical spa client." R. 395:17-18. One wore a navy
blue sweatshirt with a navy blue bandana or beany on his head ("Blue") and the
other wore a white or gray sweatshirt with a white bandana on his head ("White").
R. 395:18,77) R. 396:118. Warnock also noticed the men because "[t]hey just looked
really anxious" and "looked like they weren't sure what they were doing." R. 395:
18. They "looked like they were scoping out the place." R. 395:17.
After looking at the two men "for a minute," Warnock surmised that they
may be boyfriends of spa employees and turned her attention back to Devoge. R.
395:18. But Warnock had a "weird feeling" about the men and again looked back at
them. R. 395:18. As she did, they opened the door and walked into the spa with
handguns drawn. R. 395:18-19. With one arm covering his nose and mouth, White
walked to the front counter. R. 395: 19-21, 62. Blue told Warnock and Devoge to
step aside and directed them to a waiting area near the front counter. R. 395:19-21,
30, 88; R. 396:122. With his handgun drawn, he ordered the women to sit on the
sofa, "making sure that [they] stood still." R. 395: 20,29-31; R. 396:126. Although
4

Blue repeatedly told the women to look down, Warnock did not comply because, as
a bank employee, she knew to "look for clues like that with robbers." R. 395: 21.
Meanwhile, with his gun still drawn and an arm partially covering his face,
White ordered Octavia Martucci and Sunni Jackson, who were working behind the
front counter, to give him "all the money." R. 395:64; R. 396:120-21. When the two
women did not immediately respond to White's demand, he again demanded that
they give him the money and cocked his gun or disengaged the safety. See R. 395:
84, 91; R. 396: 121. Martucci opened the cash register, removed the cash, and
handed it to White. R. 395: 66-68,78,84. White moved his arm away from his face,
reached out, and took the money from Martucci. R. 395: 24, 68, 84.l White then
directed Martucci and Jackson to the waiting room where Warnock and Devoge
were sitting and ordered the women to lie down on the ground. R. 395:70. The two
men then fled the spa. R. 395: 24, 70, 85. After waiting several seconds, the four
women arose, locked the spa, and called police. R. 395: 24.

1

In her witness statement to police, Martucci wrote that she gave the money
to Blue, but at trial, she testified that she gave the money to White. R. 395:66-68,7880,84; DE2a. She explained that she made the mistake because at the time, she was
upset and "frazzled." R. 395:90,92. Warnock confirmed Martucci's trial testimony
that White took the money. R. 395:24. Initially, Jackson testified that Blue took the
money, but later, she testified that she "really can't remember" who took the money.
R. 396:123,126. She confirmed, however, that White "was the one that was closest
to [her] and asked [her] for the money." R. 396:126.
5

The

Investigation

The following day, sheriffs deputies arrested Timothy Dorrell for the
robbery. R. 395:102. After his arrest, Dorrell identified "Andy" as his accomplice
and told police that Andy lived in an apartment building (about a half block from
the police station) in a bottom floor apartment across from the laundry room. R.
395: 102. 2 The next day, Officer Brad Burningham of the Salt Lake City Police
Department identified the apartment address, traced the apartment to Angela
Newton, and confirmed that Andrew Brink, the defendant here, lived with her at
the apartment. R. 395: 34-36,41-42.
After verifying the residence information, Officer Burningham and a second
officer went to the apartment to question defendant. R. 395: 37. After defendant's
girlfriend admitted the officers inside, Officer Burningham asked to speak with
defendant in the outside hallway. R. 395: 37. Initially, defendant was calm, but
"[v]ery rapidly and increasingly, his demeanor b e c a m e . . . very, very a g i t a t e d . . . . "
R. 395:37-38. Fearing a confrontation, Officer Burningham handcuffed defendant.
R. 395: 38. After briefly speaking with defendant's girlfriend, Officer Burningham

2

Less than three months later, Dorrell pled guilty to the aggravated robbery.
R. 395:93,102-03. Two months after his plea, Dorrell changed his story to implicate
a "Jeffrey Chris/ 7 rather than defendant, as his accomplice. R. 395: 103. At
defendant's trial, Dorrell claimed that he falsely implicated defendant because the
two were having troubles as friends and he believed he would receive a more
favorable sentence. R. 395:100-01.
6

took defendant to the police station for questioning. R. 395: 38. There, defendant
waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with Officer Burningham. R. 395:40.
He denied any involvement in the robbery, but admitted to knowing Dorrell and
being with Dorrell for a time on the night of the robbery. R. 395:41,49. Defendant
was not arrested for the robbery at the time, but was taken to jail on a "small
warrant." R. 395: 41-42.
A few days later, Officer Burningham compiled a "six-pack photo spread"
that included a photograph of defendant. R. 395: 43-44. He and Detective Ken
Schoney then went to the Breathe Day Spa to present the photo spread to spa
employees Martucci and Jackson. R. 395:45,50. He presented the photo spread first
to Martucci, and then to Jackson, each outside the presence of the other. R. 395:46.
Before asking Martucci to review the photo spread, Officer Burningham told her
that the suspect may or may not be present. R. 395: 46, 73, 85-86, 91. Martucci
reviewed the photo spread and identified defendant (top right, number 3) as
White—the robber who demanded the money. R. 395:73-74,86. As instructed, she
drew a box around defendant's photo and signed her name next to that photo. R.
395:47,73-74; SE1. She also rated her confidence level as a 7 on a scale of 1 to 10. R.
395: 47, 74, 86; SE1. Martucci later testified at trial that her confidence level
increased when she saw defendant in person at two pretrial hearings, and that she
was "very certain" when she saw defendant at trial. R. 395: 74-76, 87-88. Jackson
7

was unable to make an identification when presented with the photo spread,
explaining that she never got a good look at White's face. See R. 396:127.
Detective Schoney also presented a photo spread that included defendant's
photograph to Alicia Warnock.

R. 395: 105-06. She was unable to identify

defendant or anyone else as one of the robbers. R. 395: 31,106. At trial, however,
Warnock identified defendant as White—the man who demanded the money from
the cash register. R. 395: 23. When defense counsel presented Martucci with an
enlarged photograph of Jeffrey Chris—the man defendant later implicated in the
robbery—she testified he was not the person who robbed her at the spa. R. 395:108.
C. Evidentiary Hearing on Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony on
Eyewitness Identification.
Dr. David Dodd received his Ph.D. in psychology at the University of
Colorado and is an associate professor of psychology at the University of Utah. R.
393:5-6. He has reviewed the literature on eyewitness perception and memory and
has conducted some of his own research on the topic. R. 393:5-6. He has testified as
an expert witness on eyewitness identification in federal and state courts in Utah
and state courts in Colorado. R. 393: 6. In preparation for his testimony at the
hearing, Dr. Dodd reviewed the police reports, the photo spread used by police, and
the testimony from the preliminary hearing. R. 393: 7.
Dr. Dodd explained that the memory process is divided into three phases:
acquisition, retention, and retrieval. R. 393:10.
8

Acquisition.

Dodd identified four concerns during the acquisition phase of

the witnesses in this case: (1) the partial covering of the face (a form of disguise)
"disrupts to some degree the accuracy" of an identification, and in this case, White
held his arm over his face, R. 393: 10,12-13; (2) White's face was "only seen very
briefly" when he took the money from Martucci, R. 393: 10, and in addition,
witnesses tend to exaggerate the time period they actually observed the perpetrator,
especially when their identification is confirmed by the officer, R. 393: 19-20; (3) a
witness's ability to acquire information is "disrupted" when they are "highly
stressed"; and (4) witnesses "do more poorly when a weapon is present" because
they "spend a lot of their time looking at the weapon rather than . . . at the face" of
the perpetrator (distraction), R. 393:12,21-22.
Retention.

Dodd testified that during the retention stage, memory may

change due to the passage of time, as when a witness forgets details. R. 393:13. He
testified that memory may also be altered during the retention stage through
"suggestion." R. 393: 13. He identified five protocols that minimize this risk:
(1) witnesses should be told that the suspect may or may not be in the photo spread
(witnesses are otherwise likely to make an identification regardless), R. 393:13-15;
(2) the foils in a photospread should match the description given by the witness, not
the suspect, R. 393:15; (3) officers should employ "double-blind" testing, where the
officer administering the photo spread does not know which of the photos is the
9

suspect's (in this way, the officer will not inadvertently cue the witness to the
suspect), R. 393: 16-17; (4) photos should be presented sequentially rather than
simultaneously (witnesses are otherwise inclined to make a "comparative
judgment" and simply choose the person who looks most like the perpetrator), R.
393:17-18; and (5) officers should not confirm an identification (otherwise witness
confidence in the accuracy of an identification is inflated), R. 393:18-19.
Retrieval

Dodd testified that the accuracy of an identification may also be

influenced by the confirmation of prior identifications. R. 393: 20. Thus, where a
witness identifies a suspect as the perpetrator in a photo spread, as in this case, her
confidence in subsequent identifications is likely to increase. R. 393: 20.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,492 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held
that trial courts must give an appropriate jury instruction on the factors affecting the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications whenever eyewitness identification is a
central issue in the case and the instruction is requested by the defense. Defendant
seeks to expand Long to also require the admission of expert testimony on
eyewitness identification whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in the
case and the proffered expert testimony will focus on the factors specific to the case
that could influence the accuracy of the witness's identification. Such a rule was
espoused in Chief Justice Durham lead opinion in State v. Maestas, 2002 UT123, %%
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19-23, 63 P.3d 621, but firmly rejected by the remainder of justices. The majority
preserved the trial court's traditional discretion in either admitting such expert
testimony or giving a Long instruction. Maestas compels affirmance in this case.
Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, the trial court did not misinterpret
State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,48 P.3d 953, as creating a per se rule of inadmissibility.
The court recognized that it could either admit the expert testimony or give a Long
instruction. After analyzing the Dr. David Dodd's proposed testimony, the court
simply concluded that a Long instruction was sufficient in this case.
Defendant claims that Dr. Dodd's testimony was necessary to advise the jury
regarding concerns in this case that the witness's identification may have been
influenced by suggestion, by an artificial increase in confidence with each
subsequent identification, and by stress and weapon focus. These factors, however,
were adequately addressed in the instruction submitted by defendant and given by
the court. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
expert testimony.
Defendant also claims that Dr. Dodd's testimony should have been admitted
under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. Because defendant fails to brief this issue,
this Court should not address it. In any event, the trial court's decision to exclude
the testimony was well within its discretion.

11

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT
TESTIMONY ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND RULING
THAT JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
COULD SUFFICIENTLY EDUCATE THE JURY
Defendant filed a notice that he would call Dr. David Dodd to testify as an
expert about "the psychological research on eyewitness identification" and "how
the research applies to the specific factors of [Octavia] Martucci's identification of
[defendant] from the photo spread." R. 42, 56-72, 87-142. The State moved to
exclude the proposed expert testimony, arguing that it would constitute a lecture to
the jury, the substance of which could be adequately conveyed in a jury instruction,
that it "would invade the province of the jury to assess credibility," and that it
would otherwise "cause confusion of the issues and waste time during trial." R. 7384.
Relying on State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,48 P.3d 953, the trial court granted
the State's motion and excluded Dr. Dodd's testimony. R. 289. After "considering]
the arguments presented by counsel and the testimony of Dr. Dodd offered on May
10, 2006," the trial court "f[ound] that Dr. Dodd's testimony would constitute a
lecture to the jury," concluded that the jury could be educated "through the use of
appropriate instructions," and "invite[d] counsel to submit instructions t h a t . . . are
appropriate in light of the evidence presented [by Dr. Dodd] regarding eyewitness
12

identification." R. 289. Thereafter, defendant submitted a proposed instruction on
the factors affecting the reliability of an eyewitness identification and, without
objection, the court gave the instruction to the jury as proposed by defendant See R.
314, 316-20,343-47; R. 396:113-14,130-31.
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling as an abuse of
discretion. Aplt. Brf. at 14. This claim lacks merit.
A. Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether to admit
expert testimony on eyewitness identification or to give cautionary
instructions on eyewitness identification.
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court
recognized that "human memory is both limited and fallible" and that "failures may
occur and inaccuracies creep in at any stage of . . . the 'memory process.'" Long
observed that "jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these problems" and may
thus give undue weight to eyewitness testimony. Id. at 490, 492. To remedy this
concern, Long held that "trial courts shall g i v e . . . an instruction [on the factors that
affect the accuracy of an identification] whenever eyewitness identification is a
central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense." Id. at
492.
Long concluded that the instruction set forth in United States v. Telfaire, 469
F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972), though imperfect, was "under most circumstances"
sufficient to educate the jury on the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness
13

identifications. Long, 721 P.2d at 494. The Court did not, however, prescribe the use
of the Telfaire instruction or any other instruction. Id. at 492-94. Instead, it granted
trial counsel and judges "some latitude" in formulating appropriate instructions
tailored to the specific case, so long as those instructions "sensitize the jury to the
factors that empirical research have shown to be of importance in determining the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications, especially those that laypersons most likely
would not appreciate." Id. at 493.
The Utah Supreme Court "'has not extended [Long's] cautionary instruction
requirement to include additional expert testimony concerning eyewitness
identification/" State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, \ 42,27 P.3d 1133 (quoting State v.
Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 427 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)).
Indeed, the Court has not adopted, "either explicitly or implicitly, a per se rule of
admissibility or inadmissibility

" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1139, 63 P.3d

621 (Russon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); accord Hubbard, 2002 UT
45, % 14. Instead, the decision of whether to admit expert testimony on eyewitness
identification lies "within the sound discretion of the trial court." Butterfield, 2001
UT 59,%43; accord Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,114; Hollen, 2002 UT 35, \ 66 (holding that
"'trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert
testimony 7 " on eyewitness identification).

14

Eyewitness experts are generally asked to give two different kinds of
testimony: (1) testimony that educates the jury on the factors known to affect the
reliability of an identification, and (2) testimony that assesses the reliability of a
particular identification based on those factors.
In the first scenario, the expert is asked to explain for the jury "the scientific
bases and

research underlying

the weaknesses

inherent in

eyewitness

identification/ 7 Id. Because such testimony "would apply to any crime or any trial"
and does not require a "knowledge of the facts of the case," it is not "in the true
sense" expert testimony, but merely "a lecture to the jury as to how they should
judge the evidence." Butterfield, 2001 UT 5 9 , 1 4 3 .
In the second scenario, the expert is asked to "analyze [the] circumstances
present when an eyewitness observed a defendant and suggest how accurate [the]
eyewitness' identification is." Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, \ 17. Hubbard noted that
"[s]uch expert testimony, regardless of whether it is presented hypothetically or by
applying the circumstances of a particular case, will result in dueling experts
evaluating for the jury how much weight to give to the testimony of percipient
witnesses." Id. This kind of testimony is especially problematic because "in our
judicial system it is the role of the jury to decide how much weight to give the
testimony of particular witnesses, not the role of independent experts." Id. at % 15.

15

The trial court is thus faced with a dilemma whenever a request is made to
admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification. Id. If the court "[p]ermit[s] an
expert witness, either directly or indirectly, to analyze the credibility of a percipient
witness for the jury," the expert, to a lesser or greater extent, "steps into the
province of the jury." Id. On the other hand, if the court excludes expert testimony
"about the limitations inherent in eyewitness identifications, the jury might not be
educated about the potential deficiencies of eyewitness identification." Id. Long's
requirement that trial courts instruct juries on these potential deficiencies and the
factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications generally resolves this
dilemma. Cf. id. (noting that if expert testimony is excluded, it "fall[s] upon the
court to instruct the jury on the limitations and problems that research has
discovered"). For this reason, trial courts have broad discretion to either admit the
expert testimony or give an appropriate Long instruction. See id. at %% 17, 20.
Hubbard explained that the decision to admit expert testimony "is a matter
best left to the trial court's discretion because of the trial court's superior position to
judge the advisability of allowing such testimony." Id. at f 1 4 . Hubbard expressed
its confidence that "[i]f the trial court determines that the better result would be to
educate the jury through a Long instruction, counsel [will] certainly [be] able to
present proposed Long instructions that explain the potential effects of certain

16

circumstances on the powers of observation and recollection and present their
positions on how the Long cautionary instruction should be given/' Id. at f 1 8 .
Accordingly, an appellate court will not reverse a decision to admit or exclude
expert testimony absent an abuse of the trial court's broad discretion, i.e., "'unless
the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" Hollen, 2002 UT 3 5 , f 6 6 (quoting
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 1993)). The discretion exercised by the trial
court "'necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate
court can properly find abuse only if... no reasonable [person] would take the view
adopted by the trial court."' See Hubbard, 2001 UT 59, \ 28 (quoting State v. Gerrard,
584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)) (brackets in original). Stated another way, "the
appellate court must uphold the trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of
reasonable disagreement." Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540,542 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000).
B. The trial court's decision to permit Long instructions that included
the proffered evidence from Dr. Dodd, in lieu of his testimony at
trial, was well within the limits of reasonability.
Defendant argues that "[t]he trial court abused its discretion in excluding the
expert testimony regarding the problems with eyewitness identification specific to
this case and determining that a jury instruction could adequately educate the jury
on the problems with eyewitness identification." Aplt. Brf. at 14. This argument
lacks merit and the Court should therefore affirm defendant's conviction.
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1. State v. Maestas rejects the per se rule of admissibility espoused
by defendant and compels affirmance of the trial court's ruling
here.
Citing Chief Justice Durham's opinion in State v. Maestas, 2002 UT123,63 P.3d
621, defendant asks this Court to adopt a rule requiring trial courts to admit expert
testimony on eyewitness identification whenever "eyewitness identification is a
central issue and the expert's testimony will focus on the specific facts of the case in
relation to the scientific evidence regarding the reliability of the eyewitness
identification." Aplt. Brf. at 18. He argues that given Long's expressed concern that
jurors are largely unaware of the inherent deficiencies in eyewitness identifications,
expert testimony is "essential to a defendant's ability to present a defense since
without such testimony, a jury's misconceptions rather than relevant evidence could
determine the outcome." Aplt. Brf. at 16-18, 21-22, 24. Because the majority in
Maestas rejected such a rule, defendant's argument must fail.
Like defendant here, see R. 56-72, Maestas moved the trial court to allow Dr.
David Dodd to testify generally "about the factors that affect the reliability of
identifications" and to testify more particularly "about the factors specific to the
Maestas case that could influence the accuracy of an eyewitness." Maestas, 2002 UT
123, Tl 13,22. As he did here, see R. 393: 7, "Dr. Dodd [in Maestas] would review
police reports, eyewitness transcripts from preliminary hearings, photo s p r e a d s . . . ,
and then review the research most relevant to the case." Id. But, as in this case, see
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R. 289, the trial court denied the motion, "ruling that a jury instruction could
sufficiently inform the jury of 'concerns about and factors affecting accuracy of
eyewitness identification/" Id. at % 13 (quoting trial court).
Chief Justice Durham authored the lead opinion in Maestas, but no other
justice joined. The Chief Justice would have reversed on this issue, agreeing with
Maestas's assertion "that he [could not] receive a fair trial without presenting expert
testimony on the credibility of eyewitness identification."

Id. at \ 19. In so

concluding, Chief Justice Durham espoused, in effect, a per se rule of admissibility
of expert testimony on eyewitness identification whenever the prosecution's case
"rests on eyewitness testimony" and the proposed expert testimony is "targeted to
the specific evidence in the case." Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ \ 22-23.
The remainder of the Court rejected the Chief Justice's approach. Associate
Chief Justice Durrant, joined by Justice Wilkins, rejected "the creation of [such] a per
se rule" and reaffirmed the trial court's "wide discretion" to exclude expert
testimony. Id. at W 68, 72 (Durrant, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Justice Russon, joined by Justice Howe, likewise rejected Chief Justice Durham's
"per se rule of admissibility." Id. at \ 139 (Russon, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part). Thus, a four-justice majority affirmed the trial court's ruling
that a jury instruction, in lieu of expert testimony, was sufficient to educate the jury
on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness identifications, firmly holding that the
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admissibility of expert testimony "'is a matter best left to the trial court's
discretion.'" See id. at ff 68,136 (quoting Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, J 14).
The Maestas majority upheld the trial court's decision to rely on Long
instructions, in lieu of expert testimony, even though Dr. Dodd was prepared to
testify, as he was here, about the factors specific to the case that could influence the
accuracy of the eyewitness identifications. See id. at \ 66. Where the circumstances
in Maestas are nearly identical to those in this case, this Court must affirm the trial
court's exercise of discretion in offering Long instructions in lieu of Dr. Dodd's
testimony.
2. The trial court properly applied the analysis set forth in State v.
Hubbard.
Defendant contends that "[r]ather than ascertaining whether the specifics of
this case required expert testimony as outlined in Hubbard, the trial court misapplied
Hubbard to create a per se rule disallowing the use of the eyewitness identification
testimony." Aplt. Brf. at 25; see also Aplt. Brf. at 19-20. He accuses the trial court of
"fail[ing] to do any independent analysis of the specific facts of this case in making
its determination regarding how jury instructions are sufficient to adequately
educate the jury on the expert's knowledge which is counterintuitive to the average
juror." Aplt. Brf. at 20. This claim lacks merit.
In granting the State's motion to exclude the expert testimony, the trial court
correctly observed that the admission of expert testimony "'is within the sound
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discretion of the trial court/" R. 289 (quoting State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, f 43,27
P.3d 1133). The court reviewed the parties 7 arguments and the testimony of Dr.
Dodd from the May 10, 2006 hearing. R. 289. After doing so, it observed "that it
would not be an abuse of discretion to admit Dr. Dodd's testimony." R. 289
(emphasis added). The court ruled, however, that under Hubbard, it was "entirely
appropriate . . . to instruct the jury instead of allowing expert testimony" because
Dr. Dodd's testimony "would 'constitute a lecture, the substance of which can be
just as adequately conveyed to the jury through the judge in a jury instruction/" R.
289 (quoting Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, i f 17-18).
The trial court thus recognized that Hubbard required it neither to admit the
expert testimony or to exclude the expert testimony. Contrary to defendant's claim,
it carefully reviewed Dr. Dodd's proposed testimony in deciding whether to admit
it. Therefore, the court did not interpret Hubbard as establishing a per se rule of
inadmissibility, as defendant suggests. It simply concluded that the information
that would otherwise be explained by Dr. Dodd could be adequately conveyed in an
instruction. As explained, this ruling was well within the court's discretion.
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
eyewitness testimony because the modified Long instruction
adequately alerted the jury to factors affecting the reliability of
the eyewitness identifications specific to this case.
Defendant argues that Dr. Dodd's testimony "was necessary 'to inform the
jury not only about the psychological research on eyewitness identification, but
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. . . how the research applies to the specific factors of [Octavia] Martucci's
identification of [defendant].'" Aplt. Brf. at 12 (citation omitted). To the extent
defendant suggests that Dr. Dodd should have been able to opine on the reliability
of Martucci's identification in light of these factors, defendant's claim fails because
to do so would invade the province of the jury "to decide how much weight to give
the testimony of particular witnesses." See Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, % 15.
Defendant also contends that jury instructions were insufficient because they
"could not adequately communicate to the jury all the concerns regarding the
fallibility of the eyewitness identification specific to this case." Aplt. Brf. at 15, 22.
Specifically, defendant contends that Dr. Dodd's testimony was necessary to discuss
(1) "studies showing that faulty original identifications based on suggestion either
intended or otherwise result in all subsequent identification being suspect," Aplt.
Brf. at 23; (2) "studies showing how a witness over time through repeated exposure
to the defendant within the criminal process becomes more confident that she has
chosen correctly and how that identification is not necessarily accurate," Aplt. Brf. at
23; and (3) studies showing the impairing effect on memory caused by "'weapon
focus/ stress, and fear," Aplt. Brf. at 24. This claim lacks merit.
Defendant has not explained why this information could not have been
adequately conveyed to a jury through a cautionary instruction. These principles
are not so complex that the jury could not have been informed of them through an
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appropriately worded instruction.

Indeed, the instruction on eyewitness

identification submitted to the jury in this case (Instruction No. 14) addressed each
of these three areas.
First, with respect to the effect of suggestion (intended or unintended clues by
police) on the reliability of original identifications, Instruction No. 14 instructed the
jury that in determining whether the identification was "completely the product of
the witness' [sic] own memory/' it should consider "the exposure of the witness to
opinions, to photographs, or to any other information or influence that may have
affected the independence of the identification of the defendant by the witness." R.
345. The instruction also instructed the jury to consider:
(f) the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the
witness for identification. For example, you may consider that
when an officer who is aware of the identity of a suspect presents a
photo spread to a witness, he may inadvertently cue the witness as
to which of the photos is the suspect. Similarly, a witness who is
presented with six photographs simultaneously may be more likely
to select one of the photos than a witness who is presented with the
photographs sequentially regardless of whether the photo of the
perpetrator is included.
R. 345-46. Second, with respect to the tendency that witness confidence in an
identification artificially increases with each subsequent identification, Instruction
No. 14 advised the jury that "a witness who has previously made an identification is
likely to become more confident in making subsequent identifications and is likely
to exaggerate the factors favorable to the witness's opportunity to observe the
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actor/' R. 344. And third, with respect to the impairing effect on memory caused by
weapon focus, stress, and fear, Instruction No. 14 advised the jury that "the capacity
of the witness is likely to be impaired [by] . . . stress or fright at the time of
observation." R. 344. The instruction further advised that in determining whether
the witnesses had an adequate opportunity to observe the perpetrator, the jury
should consider "the presence or absence of distracting . . . activity during the
observation." R. 344. This latter instruction was broad enough to include "weapon
focus," which Dr. Dodd characterized as a form of distraction. See R. 393:12,21-22.
These instructions adequately educated the jury on the three areas
complained of in defendant's brief, and as in Maestas, "g[a]ve [defendant] the
opportunity to . .. argue how each of those factors could have affected particular
eyewitnesses." Maestas, 2002 UT 123, % 74: (Durrant, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (quotations and citation omitted). Defense counsel took this
opportunity and argued each of these points, to a lesser or greater extent, in his
closing argument.

See R. 396: 141-45.

Having received the modified Long

instruction and listened to defense counsel's argument as to how those factors
affected the reliability of the eyewitnesses, the jury needed no more assistance in
making a determination about the overall reliability of the

eyewitness

identifications. The proposed expert testimony, therefore, would have added little,
if anything, to the information provided in the modified Long instruction.
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To the extent that the instructions did not fully cover the relevant factors
identified by Dr. Dodd, defendant has invited any error. The trial court "invite [d]
counsel to submit instructions that . . . are appropriate in light of the evidence
presented [by Dr. Dodd] regarding eyewitness identification/' R. 289. Defendant
submitted the modified Long instruction and the trial court gave the instruction as
submitted. See R. 314, 316-20, 343-47; R. 396: 113-14, 130-31. He cannot now
complain that the instructions were inadequate. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, <j[
54, 70 P.3d 111 (refusing to address a challenge to a jury instruction approved by
defendant).
In sum, [the] trial court's determination that expert testimony would amount
to a lecture to the jury as to how they should judge the evidence, and its subsequent
refusal to admit such testimony into evidence '[was] not an abuse of discretion,
particularly where there has been no showing that the excluded evidence would
probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict/"
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Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, J 43 (quoting State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56,61 (Utah 1982));
accord Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, <][ 20.3
4. This Court should not address defendant's rule 702 claim because
it was not adequately briefed.
Defendant notes that under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, "the test of the
admissibility of an expert's testimony is whether it assists the trier of fact, or in other
words, whether it is helpful/' Aplt. Brf. at 15. He argues that "'expert opinion is
proper when it would help to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical
knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror ....'"
Aplt. Brf. at 16 (citation omitted). Defendant suggests that because the deficiencies
of eyewitness identification are not within the knowledge of the average juror, he
was entitled to call Dr. Dodd to testify under rule 702. See Aplt. Brf. at 16-17.
Defendant's rule 702 claim fails at the outset because it is not adequately briefed on
appeal.

3

Defendant also complains that the jury instruction was inadequate because
the jury did not receive it until "after all the evidence was in." Aplt. Brf. at 15. He
argues that an expert is better able to educate the jury "when the jury [is] hearing
the evidence and determining witness credibility." Aplt. Brf. at 15. Defendant thus
suggests that the jury needed to first hear the expert testimony in order to properly
evaluate the eyewitness identifications. But as defendant's witness, Dr. Dodd
would not have testified until after the State called the eyewitnesses in its case in
chief. Thus, defendant would not have enjoyed any timing advantage had the
expert been allowed to testify. In either case, the jury would not be apprised of the
Long factors until after the witnesses had testified.
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Under rule 702, an expert "may testify" at trial if his or her "scientific,
technical, or specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 702. Utah courts have held
that in making this "helpfulness" determination, "the trial court must first decide
whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of the average
individual." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. This inquiry, however, is only the first step in
determining whether expert testimony is helpful under rule 702.
If the trial court concludes that the evidence is beyond the ken of the average
person, it must then determine whether the expert testimony "will be more
probative than prejudicial as required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence."
Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, f 30; accord Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1363 n.12 (holding that court
must "balanc[e]... the probativeness of the evidence against its potential for unfair
prejudice" as required under rule 403). This second step is "an integral element of a
rule 702 determination" and cannot be ignored. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1363 n.12. 4

4

When expert testimony is based on novel scientific principles, Utah courts
impose a three-part standard of admissibility. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388,39698 & nn.7-8 (Utah 1989). The trial court must determine (1) "whether the scientific
principles and techniques underlying the expert's testimony are inherently reliable,"
(2) whether "the scientific principles or techniques at issue have been properly
applied to the facts of the particular case by sufficiently qualified experts," and (3)
"whether the proffered scientific evidence will be more probative than prejudicial as
required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638,
641 (Utah 1996); accord Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 397-98 & nn.7-8.
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In making the rule 403 determination, Utah courts have held that "the relative
probative value of the proffered scientific evidence of a fact in issue becomes
important/ 7 Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8. "For example, if the scientific proof is
based on undeniably valid scientific premises, has a high degree of power to
accurately determine the existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue, and is easily
replicable and its application to similar situations has been tested and validated
often, then the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the
jury, etc., attendant to its introduction would have to be great indeed to preclude its
admission." Id. On the other hand, "if there were weaknesses in the testimony on
some or all of these points, then it would be relatively easier to show that the
dangers of admission outweighed the probativeness of the testimony." Id.
Other important variables in making the rule 403 determination include "the
nature of the evidence offered, the quality of the other evidence available to the
finder of fact, and the centrality of the issue to which the scientific evidence is
directed." Id. For example, a stronger probativeness showing should be required
"'when the inferences from the scientific evidence sweep broadly or cut deeply into
sensitive areas/" that is, into areas that are "central to the core of the fact-finding
process—whether one witness or another is telling the truth." Id. (citation omitted).
On appeal, defendant addresses only the first step of the helpfulness
determination, arguing that he was entitled to introduce the expert testimony
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because jurors are largely unaware of the factors affecting the accuracy of
eyewitness identifications. See R. 394: 44-47; Aplt. Brf. at 15-16. He has wholly
failed to address, much less analyze, the proposed testimony under rule 403.
Accordingly, the Court should decline to address defendant's rule 702 claim. See
State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, \ \ 13,15, 72 P.3d 138 (declining to address claims
that were not supported by legal analysis).
In any event, the trial court has "wide discretion in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony" under rule 702, Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361, and an
abuse of that discretion will be found "'only if . . . no reasonable [person] would
take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, \ 28 (quoting
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887) (brackets in original). Where the Supreme Court has
consistently held, in Butterfield, Hollen, Hubbard, and Maestas, that trial courts have
the discretion to give Long instructions in lieu of admitting expert testimony, it
cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in doing so here.
The Utah Supreme Court has not fully explained the relationship between
rule 702 and its decisions in Butterfield, Hollen, Hubbard, and Maestas.

An

examination of those decisions, however, suggests that the Court's refusal to require
expert testimony on eyewitness identification stems from the potential that such
testimony maybe unfairly prejudicial under rule 403. See Utah R. Evid. 403 (stating
that relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially
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outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice"). In those cases, the Court implicitly
recognizes that expert testimony on eyewitness identification carries the risk that a
jury will simply accept the expert's judgments and thereby abdicate its role as fact
finder on the critical issue of witness credibility. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, f 74
(Durrant, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ^ f 15,
20; Hollen, 2002 UT 35, \ 70; Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, % 43. The Long instruction
resolves this concern while ensuring that the jury is adequately informed of the
factors affecting the accuracy of an eyewitness identification. See supra, at 16.
Moreover, where a Long instruction is given, admission of expert testimony
on eyewitness identification may likewise be excluded under rule 403 because it
could cause "confusion of the issues," "undue delay," a "waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403; see Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,
\ 44; Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ 66 (Durrant, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
In sum, expert testimony would not be helpful under rule 702 where, as here,
Long instructions adequately educate the jury on the factors affecting the reliability
of an eyewitness identification and defendant can argue how those factors may have
affected the eyewitness identifications. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ \ 74 (Durrant, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part). The trial court below concluded that it
could "educate the jury through the use of appropriate instructions instead of
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through expert testimony/ 7 R. 289. Given the risk that a jury would defer to the
expert rather than make its own reliability determination, the trial court's ruling was
reasonable under rule 702. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ 74 (Durrant, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted June 6,2007.
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General

-j££ffey S. Gray
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR-'
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

e

^^yoh^r

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 061900386
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

v.
ANDREW BRINK,

Date: May 31, 2006

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the State's Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony
Regarding Eyewitness Identification. Having considered the arguments presented by counsel and the
testimony of Dr. Dodd offered on May 10, 2006, the Court GRANTS the State's Motion.
"Whether expert testimony on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness identification should be
allowed is within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,143, 27 P.3d
1133 (citations omitted). While the Court finds that it would not be an abuse of discretion to admit Dr.
Dodd's testimony, the Court finds State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48 P.3d 953 particularly persuasive on
this issue. In Hubbard, the court found that when an expert's testimony would "constitute a lecture, the
substance of which can be just as adequately conveyed to the jury through the judge in a jury instruction,
as opposed to through expert testimony," it is entirely appropriate for the trial judge to choose to instruct
the jury instead of allowing expert testimony. Id. atfflf17-18. In the present case, the Court finds that Dr.
Dodd's testimony would constitute a lecture to the jury and, therefore, the Court chooses to educate the jury
through the use of appropriate instructions instead of through expert testimony.
The Court, however, is persuaded by Dr. Dodd's testimony and the supplemental materials provided
by Defense counsel, that Long instructions may not adequately address all of the problems inherent with
eyewitness testimony and particularly with photographic lineups. In following Hubbard fs admonition that
courts "specifically tailor instructions other than those offered in Long [to] address the deficiencies inherent
in eyewitness identification" (id. at ^ 20), the Court invites counsel to submit instructions that they believe
are appropriate in light of the evidence presented regarding eyewitness identification.
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